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The authors examine the experience of selected central banks that have used large-scale balance-
sheet expansion, frequently referred to as “quantitative easing,” as a monetary policy instrument.
The case studies focus on central banks responding to the recent financial crisis and Nordic central
banks during the banking crises of the 1990s; others are provided for comparison purposes. The
authors conclude that large-scale balance-sheet increases are a viable monetary policy tool provided
the public believes the increase will be appropriately reversed. (JEL E40, E52, E58)
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rently sparse empirical evidence suggests that
quantitative easing actions likely must be large
because the private-sector’s substitution elastici-
ties among high-quality financial assets are small.
In this article, we examine the experience of
selected central banks that have used large-scale
balance-sheet expansion as a policy instrument.
We conclude that such increases are a viable
monetary policy tool for central banks with sig-
nificant independence and credibility, assuming
the public believes the increase will be appropri-
ately reversed.
To some analysts, large balance-sheet
increases raise the specter of higher inflation.
Historically, an absence of fiscal discipline was
the cause of large-scale increases in central bank
balance sheets. Sargent (1982), for example,
reviews cases of hyperinflation and Meltzer (2005)
reviews monetary policy in the United States dur-
T
he recent financial crisis has challenged
monetary policymakers around the
world on a scale that has not been seen
since the 1930s. In normal times, the
monetary policy for most central banks is imple-
mented by (i) targeting an overnight interest rate
and (ii) holding as assets securities issued by
the country’s own national treasury. In some
cases, a central bank’s assets also include foreign
exchange or other nations’ sovereign debt. When
large shocks occur and in response the policy
rate has already been reduced to (near) zero,
some central banks have aggressively expanded
their balance sheet, a policy widely referred to
as quantitative easing.1 In the United States, for
example, the Federal Reserve’s mid-2010 balance
sheet was approximately triple its size of two
years earlier.
The essence of quantitative easing policies is
the purchase of assets from the private sector
with newly created central bank deposits; such
exchanges promise to reduce both risk and term
premia in longer-term interest rates.2 The cur-
1 See Bernanke and Reinhart (2004).
2 See Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004). Purchasing lower-quality
assets raises discussion of the boundary between monetary and
fiscal policy. Recent academic papers include those by Jeanne and
Svensson (2007), Cúrdia and Woodford (2010a,b), Gertler and
Karadi (2009), Reis (2009), Borio and Disyatat (2009), and
Söderström and Westermark (2009).
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the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland,
Australia, and others have proactively used mas-
sive balance-sheet changes as a policy tool while
sustaining a commitment to avoid rapid inflation.
SOME MACROECONOMIC 
THEORY
Our principal lesson—that large, visible
money injections made in response to special
events can increase near-term economic activity
without increasing inflation if policymakers credi-
bly commit to reverse the increase at a later date—
arises in a variety of macro models. The key
element is that inflation expectations are little
affected by increases in central bank balance
sheets that are perceived as temporary. Goodfriend
and King (1981) showed this result in the context
of Barro’s (1976) rational expectations model by
introducing a central bank that credibly commits
to a long-run path for the money stock even while
sharply increasing the near-term money supply.3
Recently Berentsen and Waller (2009) showed the
same result in a search-theoretic real business
cycle model.4 In contrast, many early rational
expectations macroeconomic models (during the
1970s) specified that all changes in the money
supply were unanticipated and permanent—that
is, the money stock followed a random walk. In
such models, changes in the money stock, because
they were anticipated to be permanent, caused
the price level to jump and real economic activity
to remain unchanged. Similar results arise in the
classical long-run equilibria of New Keynesian
models that contain incomplete information and
adjustment costs, although there may be interim
increases in economic activity.5
A central bank’s promise to reverse a large-
scale balance-sheet increase in a timely fashion
lacks credibility if the central bank is not suffi-
ciently independent of the political process.
Although earlier studies tended to be equivocal
regarding a negative correlation between inflation
and central bank independence, more recent
research using longer sample periods and broader
measures has found stronger correlations (Crowe
and Meade, 2008). Central banks that have used
quantitative easing successfully rank high on
measures of independence, transparency, and
accountability. Laurens, Arnone, and Segalotto
(2009), for example, ranked 98 central banks on
these characteristics—successful central banks
(except Australia) tended to rank at or above the
15th percentile. The Sveriges Riksbank (Sweden)
and the Swiss National Bank (SNB) are ranked
4th and 5th, respectively. The Reserve Bank of




This section explores the practical use of
large-scale balance-sheet increases as a policy
instrument. Selected countries with recent large-
scale central bank balance-sheet increases are
shown in Table 1.6 A subset of these countries is
explored in greater detail. The countries loosely
fall into three groups: (i) countries that responded
in a temporary manner to the recent financial
crisis, (ii) the Nordic countries during the banking
Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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3 Specifically, Goodfriend and King (1981, p 382) outline a mecha-
nism by which “for a given wealth, an individual who suffers an
anticipated temporary reduction in measured real balances might
shift expenditure from present to future periods, in order to take
advantage of lower net costs of transactions in these periods.”
Presumably a sharp but temporary increase in money balances
provided by the central bank might induce individuals to shift
expenditure to present from future periods to take advantage of
now-lower costs in the present period.
4 The Berentsen-Waller model (2009) is based on the Lagos-Wright
double coincidence of wants framework. Monetary policy is
assumed to have short-run and long-run components, the former
focused on stabilizing real activity (in the presence of shocks) and
the latter on the long-run inflation trend.
5 See, for example, Woodford (2003) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler
(1999). Among the differences in these papers noted by Berentsen
and Waller (2009, p. 2) is that New Keynesian models rely on “nomi-
nal rigidities, such as price or wage stickiness, that allows monetary
policy to have real effects” and that the models “are ‘cashless’ in
the sense that there are no monetary trading frictions.” In their
general equilibrium real business cycle model, all prices are flexible
but money overcomes trading frictions. Hence, in New Keynesian
models, ad hoc stickiness may allow real effects of monetary shocks
even under complete information. 
6 The currency symbols used throughout the text are listed in Table 1.
Unless otherwise indicated, monetary values are listed as U.S.
dollars.Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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Doubling of the Monetary Base in Selected Countries
NOTE: The figure displays 10 cases of extraordinary monetary base changes in nine countries. To illustrate clearly the magnitude of the
change, in each panel the monetary base series is indexed (normalized) to 100 at the first observation. The horizontal (time) scale varies
by country, reflecting primarily four different episodes. Changes in the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden (2000s),
Iceland, and Australia reflect the 2008 global financial crisis. Changes in Finland and Sweden during the 1990s reflect the Nordic banking
crisis. Changes in Japan reflect its quantitative easing from 2001-06. Finally, New Zealand increased its monetary base permanently in
2006 to improve operation of its payment system. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Bank of England, Swiss National Bank, Bank of Japan, Sveriges Riksbank, International Monetary
Fund, Central Bank of Iceland, Reserve Bank of Australia, and Reserve Bank of New Zealand.Anderson, Gascon, Liu


























2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1999
United States United Kingdom
Switzerland Japan
















































































































Central Bank Policy Rates
NOTE: The figure displays central bank policy rates in nine countries and the euro zone. In some cases, dramatic decreases in policy
target rates accompanied expansions of the monetary base. In others, changes were modest (e.g, Australia and New Zealand). In the
1990s, foreign exchange crises occasionally caused sharp increases in policy rates not accompanied closely by changes in the mone-
tary base (e.g., Sweden and Finland). The Bank of Japan kept the uncollateralized overnight call rate as low as 0 percent during the
quantitative easing period.
Rates shown (daily data): United States, federal funds rate; United Kingdom, Bank Rate; Switzerland, target range of 3-month LIBOR
rate; Japan, uncollateralized overnight call rate; Sweden, marginal rate (January 1990–May 1994), and repo rate (June 1994–present);
Finland, tender rate (January 1993–December 1998), and minimum bid rate of the European Central Bank’s main financing operation
(January 1999–present); Australia, interbank overnight cash rate; Iceland, nominal discount rate; New Zealand, Official Cash Rate; euro
zone, minimum bid rate of the European Central Bank’s main financing operation. Sweden’s official interest rate topped 50 percent
in September 1992 as the result of the Riksbank’s exchange rate defense. We omit observations of Sweden’s marginal rate that are
higher than 24 percent. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Central Bank of Iceland, Bank of England, Swiss National Bank, Bank of Finland, Bank of Japan,
European Central Bank, Bank of Russia, Riksbank, Reserve Bank of Australia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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Consumer Price Inflation: Year-over-year increase in consumer prices (monthly)
Expected Inflation: Anticipated change in consumer prices during the next 12 months (monthly)
Figure 3
Actual and Expected Inflation
SOURCE: United States, Survey of Consumers conducted by Thomson Reuters and the University of Michigan; United Kingdom,
Citigroup Inflation Tracker conducted by YouGov and Citigroup; Australia, Melbourne Institute Survey of Consumer Inflationary
Expectations conducted by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research; New Zealand, Survey of Expectations
conducted by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand; Sweden, Consumer Tendency Survey conducted by the National Institute of Economic
Research; Finland, Consumer Survey conducted by Statistics Finland; Japan, Consumer Confidence Survey conducted by the Economic
and Social Research Institute. Values of expected inflation in Japan are calculated using the median of the anticipated change in con-
sumer prices during the next 12 months. Switzerland, Consumer Confidence Survey by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs.
Switzerland’s Consumer Confidence Survey reports an index of expected inflation. Data are transformed into an index with a mean
equal to the mean consumer price inflation series over the observed period. crisis of the 1990s, and (iii) selected other coun-
tries, for comparison, with (apparently) permanent
increases. Figure 1 shows changes in the monetary
base of these countries during periods of quanti-
tative easing (each country’s series is normalized
to 100 at the date when major balance-sheet
expansion began).7 Sweden’s monetary base
during the Nordic banking crisis of the 1990s,
for example, rapidly doubled and remained at
that level for two years before slowly returning
to its pre-expansion level. Japan’s monetary base
increased slowly starting in 2001 and fell rapidly
in 2006 when the Bank of Japan (BOJ) reversed
policy. New Zealand, in a cooperative agreement
with its banks to improve operation of the pay-
ment system, doubled its monetary base to a new,
sustained level. 
Large-scale balance-sheet increases in
response to financial crises often occur after
policymakers have reduced their target interest
rate to (near) zero; the paths of central bank policy
rates are shown in Figure 2. During December
2008, for example, the BOJ reduced its target over  -
night interest rate to 0.1 percent and the Federal
Reserve reduced its target federal funds rate to a
range between zero and 0.25 percent. Exceptions
are Australia and Iceland, which are discussed
later.
Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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7 Generally, the monetary base is defined as the sum of currency in
circulation outside the central bank plus deposits of financial
institutions at the central bank. Variations for individual countries
are noted in the case studies.
INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
Well-anchored inflation expectations are crucial to the success of unconventional monetary
policy actions, including large increases in central bank balance sheets. Figure 3 shows both con-
sumer price inflation and expected inflation for selected countries that have experienced such
increases. Actual inflation is measured as the year-over-year increase in consumer prices. Expected
inflation is the anticipated change in consumer prices during the next 12 months as determined
from household surveys. We selected household surveys based on their availability across coun-
tries. Other surveys are available. A cross-country comparison of inflation expectations is routinely
included in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s Survey of
Expectations is a market-based survey, whereas all other surveys are household based. A compari-
son of household surveys and market surveys can be found in Batchelor and Dua (1989). 
The onset of financial crisis and recession typically reduces both actual and expected infla-
tion. At the same time, if expansionary monetary policies are anticipated to stimulate economic
activity, households might expect that actual inflation will return to its long-run trend in the near
future. This pattern is evident in most of the countries we surveyed.
During 2008, for example, the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden,
and Australia experienced sharp decreases in actual and expected inflation. At the end of 2008,
expected inflation generally stabilized (albeit at a lower rate than the recent trend) even as actual
inflation continued to fall. As economic activity stabilized during 2009, inflation expectations
increased (particularly in the second quarter), even while actual inflation continued to ease. Higher
expectations were somewhat validated by higher inflation during the second half of 2009. It appears
that both actual and expected inflation had returned to the long-run trends by the end of 2009.
The 1990s Nordic banking crisis is another example. Inflation in Sweden and Finland was high
in 1990 and 1991. As Swedish and Finnish central banks and governments pursued aggressive
expansionary policy, consumer price inflation declined below these central banks’ inflation tar-
gets. The National Institute of Economic Research in Sweden and Statistics Finland started to sur-
vey inflation expectations in 1993 and 1995, respectively. In both countries, expected inflation
was stable around the respective central bank’s inflation target.The inflation experience in these countries
is shown in Figure 3, which displays both actual
inflation and survey-based measures of expected
inflation. Consistent with the visibility of the
financial crisis and high credibility levels of these
central banks, inflation expectations moved little,
if at all, as balance sheets increased—indeed, the
time series for actual and anticipated inflation
are nearly indistinguishable.
The United States8
Before September 2008, the size of the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet had changed little during
the financial crisis of 2007-08 because holdings of
Treasury securities decreased as lending through
credit-market programs increased (Figure 4). In
September, the Fed ceased shrinking its Treasury
portfolio and large-scale balance-sheet increases
began. In turn, the federal funds rate slipped
steadily; on December 16, 2008, the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) set a target
range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 0.025 per-
cent. On November 25, 2008, the Federal Reserve
announced that it would purchase up to $100
billion of debt issued by the Federal Home Loan
Banks, FNMA, and FHLMC, plus up to $500 bil-
lion of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed
by FNMA, FHLMC, and GNMA with the stated
purpose to “reduce the cost and increase the avail-
ability of credit for the purchase of houses.”9
Purchases began in January 2009. 
As of late January 2009, the Federal Reserve’s
total assets and liabilities were approximately
$2 trillion versus $900 billion in late August
2008; purchases of housing-related debt and MBS
accounted algebraically for about one-third of
the increase and a variety of credit and lending
programs accounted for the rest. 
At its March 17-18, 2009, meeting the FOMC
announced its intent to purchase by year-end
2009 up to $1.25 trillion of agency MBS and up
to $200 billion of agency debt, plus up to $300
billion in longer-term Treasury securities during
the next six months. These purchases, later
referred to as the Large-Scale Asset Purchase
program, sustained the size of the Fed balance
sheet even as various credit and lending programs
closed. As of the April 2010 FOMC meeting, total
assets were $2.34 trillion.
United Kingdom
Rapid expansion of the U.K.’s monetary base
began in February 2009, eventually tripling to
£208.04 billion in July 2009 from £68.69 billion
in January 2009. Motivating aggressive increases
in the monetary base was a sharp slowing in eco-
nomic activity: Real output during 2008:Q4 and
2009:Q1 fell at 7 percent and 10 percent annual
rates, respectively. The Bank of England (BOE)’s
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) had reduced
its policy rate (Bank Rate) from 5 percent in
October 2008 to 1 percent in February 2009.10 Yet,
forecasts suggested an increased risk that inflation
might undershoot the MPC’s 2 percent target.
In March, the MPC decided to ease monetary
conditions in the United Kingdom by reducing
Bank Rate to 0.5 percent and to begin aggressive
expansion of its balance sheet. The Bank’s first
purchase was £75 billion of government bonds
(gilts) during the first week of March. During
March, the Bank purchased £982 million of com-
mercial paper, £128 million of commercial bonds,
and £12.9 billion of gilts. The monetary base rose
to £90.12 billion by the end of March.11 By the
end of May, additional purchases pushed the
BOE’s total assets close to £300 billion and the
monetary base to £156.14 billion.
Figure 5 shows the impact of these programs
on the BOE’s balance sheet and the monetary base.
8 See Bernanke (2009) for a summary of the U.S. experience.
9 GNMA (Government National Mortgage Association, or “Ginnie
Mae”), part of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop -
ment, issues no debt but does issue MBS on which it guarantees
payment of principal and interest. FNMA (Federal National
Mortgage Association, or “Fannie Mae”) and FHLMC (Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or “Freddie Mac”) issue both
debt and MBS on which they guarantee the timely payment of
principal and interest.
Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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10 Before March 5, 2008, the U.K. Asset Purchase Facility (APF) pur-
chased £986 million in commercial paper. Because these purchases
were financed by the sale to the public of Treasury bills, and hence
had little impact on the monetary base, we omit them from our
analysis. For details of the APF’s operation, see BOE (2009a,b).
11 In 2006 the BOE discontinued publication of its monetary base,
referred to as M0. Here, we calculate the monetary base as the
sum of BOE banknotes in circulation plus deposits of banks at the
BOE (reserves).Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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Composition of Federal Reserve Balance Sheet
NOTE: See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, U.S. Financial Data, for a description of chart categories. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1. Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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Composition of Bank of England Balance Sheet
SOURCE: Bank of England (www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/balancesheet/).On the asset side of the balance sheet, the large
increase in the “Long-Term Reverse Repo” cate-
gory reflects the assets acquired by expanding
the types of collateral that may be pledged on
traditional lending facilities. The later increase
in the “Other Assets” category reflects the BOE’s
increase in dollar lending and assets purchased
under the Asset Purchase Facility. On the liabili-
ties side of the BOE’s balance sheet, the monetary
base is measured as the sum of “Notes in Circula  -
tion” plus “Reserves” at the BOE. Note that the
BOE issues liabilities (BOE bills) that are not part
of the monetary base as we have measured it in
this analysis. During the fall of 2008, the BOE
issued 1-week maturity bills to finance expanded
lending to banks. The BOE shifted away from
using its own bills for financing during 2009,
causing liabilities in the “Short-Term Market
Operations” category to decline and bank reserves
to increase.
The BOE reports that balance-sheet actions
reduced yields on medium- and long-dated gov-
ernment bonds, as well as spreads of commercial
paper and commercial bonds over overnight index
swaps. Yields on 10-year U.K. bonds fell when
purchase programs were announced and subse-
quently drifted upward as purchases occurred.
Inflation expectations plummeted from a high of
4.5 percent in September 2008 to a low of 1 per-
cent (see the dashed line in Figure 3) before later
drifting and leveling off near 2 percent. 
Switzerland
The impact of the global financial crisis on
Switzerland has been modest, albeit sufficient to
result in recession. During 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q1,
real gross domestic product (GDP) declined at an
annual rate of 2.5 percent and 3.5 percent, respec-
tively. The Swiss National Bank’s (SNB) 2009
Financial Stability Report describes the steps they
took.12 In October 2008 the SNB reduced its target
for the 3-month Swiss franc London Interbank
offering rate (LIBOR) and began expanding its
balance sheet. The SNB also began participating
in foreign currency swaps with the Federal
Reserve in October 2008, eventually reaching
more than CHF 60 billion in March 2009. In
December 2008 the SNB created a loan stabiliza-
tion fund to “finance the acquisition of illiquid
assets from UBS, largely composed of assets
backed by US residential and commercial mort-
gages.” Under terms of the loan, UBS, among
other financial institutions, will make partial
payments extending up to 12 years. (Assets in
this program were CHF 22 billion as of September
2009.) Between October 2008 and April 2009,
the Swiss monetary base approximately tripled,
reaching CHF 117 billion in April 2009. On
March 12, 2009, the SNB announced a policy
shift toward foreign exchange market interven-
tion, saying the appreciation of the Swiss franc
“represents an inappropriate tightening of mone-
tary conditions.”
The SNB’s unconventional policies sharply
increased the size of its balance sheet and the
Swiss monetary base. Figure 6 shows the growth
and changing composition of the SNB assets and
liabilities. The largest increase among assets is in
foreign currency swap transactions. On the liabili-
ties side, the largest increase is in bank deposits
at the SNB (top category on the graph)—from an
average of CHF 6 billion in 2007 to more than
CHF 75 billion in March 2009. To temper the
increase in the monetary base and “absorb liquid-
ity in the market” resulting from unconventional
monetary policies, the SNB began issuing its
own debt in October 2008 (labeled as “SNB Debt
Certificates” in Figure 6). As of September 2009,
the SNB had CHF 25 billion outstanding in SNB
notes. These notes have a maximum maturity of
one month.
Although we cannot yet assess the impact, if
any, of the monetary base expansion on inflation,
it seems reasonable to explore the SNB’s inflation
forecasts underlying its policy actions. In March
2009, the SNB forecast deflation for most of 2009
and close to zero inflation in 2010 and 2011. The
forecast six months later projects deflation only
in early 2009 and 2 percent inflation by the end
of 2011. Perhaps tripling the monetary base has
forestalled further undesired decreases in infla-
tion (or even deflation): Inflation expectations
plummeted in mid-2008, reaching close to zero
Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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12 For additional details, see Swiss National Bank (2009); all quota-
tions in this section are from this report.Anderson, Gascon, Liu











































































Composition of the Swiss National Bank Balance Sheet
SOURCE: Swiss National Bank.percent by March 2009 (see Figure 3). Expected
inflation has been positive and slowly trending
upward since the SNB began quantitative easing.
Japan
Japan’s economic growth has slowed sharply
since the bursting of the asset price bubble in the
early 1990s—from a 5.1 percent annual rate dur-
ing the latter half of the 1980s, to a 1.5 percent
annual rate during the 1990s, to a less than 0.5
percent annual rate since 2000.13 Here, we review
three episodes of BOJ quantitative easing efforts—
the zero interest rate policy of the 1990s, a quan-
titative easing policy from 2001 to 2006, and its
actions in response to the most recent financial
crisis.
During the 1990s, the BOJ adopted the “zero
interest rate policy” regime in which the policy
target rate (overnight call rate) was set at 0.1 per-
cent. The BOJ maintained its balance sheet at a
level just sufficient to sustain the overnight call
rate (near) zero. Nevertheless, real GDP growth
during the decade averaged only 1.5 percent per
year and the economy was stagnant at the decade’s
end. Worse, the threat of deflation had not eased—
year-over-year consumer price index (CPI) infla-
tion was negative (see Figure 3).
In March 2001, with a policy rate at zero, the
BOJ initiated a quantitative easing policy in which
it would maintain the call rate at zero until the
year-over-year increase in the CPI “became posi-
tive on a sustained basis.”14 The expansion of
the balance sheet was regulated by a targeted level
of current account balances held by banks at the
BOJ. To achieve its targets, the BOJ purchased
government securities and bank bills backed by
eligible collateral (i.e., corporate bonds or com-
mercial paper). The BOJ more or less smoothly
increased its holdings of long-term Japanese gov-
ernment bonds (JGBs); its holdings doubled by
2006 to roughly ¥90 trillion. In contrast, the BOJ
purchased bank bills to quickly increase its bal-
ance sheet, reaching roughly ¥40 trillion in 2006
(Figure 7). The BOJ began a two-tier exit strategy
in 2006 when the CPI displayed signs of steady
increase, allowing its holdings of bank bills and
long-term government securities (JGBs) to run
off. Empirical studies have concluded that the
BOJ’s policy actions reduced longer-term rates,
thereby flattening the yield curve, and had a
positive, but small, effect on economic growth
(Ugai, 2007).
In response to the current financial crisis,
the BOJ reduced its policy target rate to 0.3 per-
cent from 0.5 percent on October 31, 2008, and
to 0.1 percent on December 19, 2008, and has
initiated or expanded several programs to provide
funds to the market.15 Commercial paper was
purchased outright during 2009:Q1 (¥1.6 trillion)
but a rapid runoff occurred during the second
quarter, and corporate bond purchases were made
during the third quarter (¥400 billion). In addition,
approximately ¥4 trillion of commercial paper
was purchased during the first quarter under repo,
and approximately ¥6 trillion in “special funds”
was provided to banks as advances against cor-
porate debt as collateral. These combined actions
were modest relative to the size of the BOJ’s bal-
ance sheet (see Figure 7).
In November 2009, the BOJ declared that the
economy had officially entered a period of defla-
tion with a negative year-over-year change in the
CPI. On December 1, 2009, the BOJ announced
a new liquidity supply initiative to fight weak
economic activity, deflation, and a rising yen
exchange rate. This program calls for the BOJ to
furnish up to ¥10 trillion in 3-month loans to
banks at the 0.1 percent target level of the policy
rate (overnight unsecured call rate) against a
variety of collateral, including JGBs, corporate
bonds, and commercial paper. The BOJ said the
program should “further enhance easy monetary
conditions” and “encourage a further decline in
longer term interest rates.” Deflation continues
in Japan, however, with a pace of –1 percent per
year as of April 2010 (see Nishimura, 2010).
Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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13 Shirakawa (2010) argues that quantitative easing policy actions
successfully boosted Japanese economic activity and the story of
“The Lost Decade” is myth.
14 For details, see Oda and Ueda (2007) or Maeda et al. (2005).
Humpage and Shenk (2008) provide a very readable summary.
Shiratsuka (2009) summarizes recent thought.
15 The BOJ’s actions as of April 2010 are well summarized in “The
Bank of Japan’s Policy Measures in the Current Financial Crisis”
(www.boj.or.jp/en/type/exp/seisaku_cfc/index.htm).Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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Composition of Bank of Japan Balance Sheet
NOTE: The monetary base of Japan is approximately the sum of banknotes in circulation outside the BOJ plus deposits held by banks
at the BOJ.
SOURCE: Bank of Japan.Scandinavia
Sweden and Finland provide a unique set of
cases because they have each undergone two
episodes of quantitative easing during the past
two decades: once during the banking crisis of
the 1990s and more recently during the 2007-09
financial crisis. They are excellent case studies
of how to do it right.
Sweden. Sweden was affected by two severe
financial crises during the past two decades: the
1990s Nordic banking crisis and the 2007-08
global financial crisis. Each time, the Riksbank
used large-scale increases in its balance sheet as
a policy tool; the monetary base more than dou-
bled during the Nordic banking crisis and has
tripled during the most recent global financial
crisis.
The Nordic banking crisis of the early 1990s
affected all Scandinavian countries.16 In each
country, central bank support to the banking sys-
tem sharply increased the nation’s monetary base.
Starting in 1992, the Riksbank used its foreign
currency reserves to provide liquidity support to
banks. Because the government had guaranteed
all bank debt, the Riksbank allowed banks to bor-
row freely through normal liquidity facilities.
The monetary base more than doubled within 10
months—from SEK 83.73 billion in August 1993
to SEK 208.26 billion in June 1994. When condi-
tions stabilized, the monetary base decreased
rapidly to SEK 81.11 billion by February 1997.
Although inflation did not increase significantly
during or after the monetary base expansion
period, CPI inflation during 1994 was more than
double the Riksbank’s 2 percent inflation target
and inflation expectations increased modestly as
the Riksbank expanded its balance sheet. As a
result, even with the monetary base at elevated
levels, the Riksbank gradually increased its policy
target rate during 1994 and 1995. The inflation
rate returned to a 2 percent pace by late 1995,
slipping negatively the following year. Inflation
expectations retreated below the Riksbank’s 2
percent inflation target to near 1.5 percent.
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Policy actions by the Riksbank during the
recent financial crisis resemble those during the
1990s. The growth and composition of the
Riksbank’s balance sheet are shown in Figure 8.
In September 2008, the Riksbank created a loan
facility that provided access to U.S. dollars, funded
by currency swap agreements with the Federal
Reserve.17 This program increased the balance-
sheet asset item “Claims on Residents inside
Sweden Denominated in Foreign Currency” and
the liability item “Liabilities outside Sweden
Denominated in Kronor.” To further assist banks,
in October 2008 the Riksbank created an addi-
tional loan facility designed to accept collateral
with maturities longer than those accepted at its
traditional lending facilities.
To fund some lending programs, the Riksbank
issued debt—Riksbank certificates—with a matu-
rity of one week. The Riksbank, unlike other
central banks, includes these certificates in its
measure of the monetary base (see Figure 8).18
Based on this measure, Sweden’s monetary base
increased almost fivefold from SEK 105.92 billion
in September 2008 to a peak in November 2009.
Alternatively, measured using the commonplace
definition of the monetary base as the sum of
currency in circulation plus the deposits held
by financial institutions at the central bank,
Sweden’s monetary base tripled to peak of SEK
319 billion in December 2008.
Finland. Finland likely was the country
most severely affected by the Nordic banking
crisis, recording decreases in real GDP growth
for three consecutive years (1990:Q3–1993:Q3).19
From 1992 to 1997, strong government interven-
tion included equity investments in the nation’s
16 Honkapohja (2009) and Anderson (2009) discuss causes and the
policy response; see also the references cited therein.
17 For details, see Öberg (2009).
18 For comparison purposes, the data in Figure 1 report a measure of
the monetary base without Riksbank certificates.
19 The Bank of Finland’s takeover of the shaky commercial bank
Skopbank in the fall of 1991 perhaps was the climax of the coun-
try’s financial crisis. Skopbank was one of the pillars of Finland’s
commercial banking industry, widely referred to as the “central
bank” for the country’s savings banks. The takeover is reported to
have eventually cost FIM 15 billion, the equivalent of 3 percent of
GDP in 1991 (Sandal, 2004). The eventual resolution of the crisis
and unwinding of government support programs cost Finland an
amount equal to approximately 6 percent of one year’s GDP; for
Sweden and Norway, the eventual cost was near zero. For addi-
tional details, see Anderson (2009).Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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Composition of the Riksbank’s Balance Sheet
NOTE: The Riksbank defines Sweden’s monetary base as “Currency in Circulation” plus “Bank Deposits” and “Riksbank Certificates.”
SOURCE: The Riksbank.Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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Composition of Bank of Finland’s Balance Sheet
SOURCE: Bank of Finland.banks and in a government-funded bank guaran-
tee fund. By the end of 1997, the government had
extended FIM 43 billion in direct bank support.20
The Finnish monetary base expanded from FIM
34.5 billion in January 1992 to FIM 68.7 billion
in March 1997 (Figure 9). Banking institutions
started repaying the government in October
1997; thereafter, the monetary base decreased
rapidly to FIM 36.2 billion in December 1997.
Inflation in Finland was high before the bank-
ing crisis started: The monthly year-over-year CPI
rate topped 7 percent in spring 1990 and stayed
above 5 percent during 1990. Inflation subsided
as the crisis deepened; the year-over-year rate
fell below 2 percent (the Bank of Finland’s infla-
tion target) in mid-1993. Inflation remained low
for the remainder of the 1990s and inflation expec-
tations remained anchored between 2 and 2.5
percent.
Finland adopted the euro in 1999, and hence
during the financial crisis of 2007-09 exercised
no independent monetary policy. Its response
has been limited to banking supervision and
support (Liikanen, 2009). Perhaps the largest
country-specific impact was the spinoff of the
Finnish operations of the Icelandic bank Glitnir
into a new Finnish corporation in October 2008.
OTHER CASES OF LARGE-SCALE
BALANCE-SHEET INCREASES
In this section, we briefly examine the expe-
riences of three other countries with recent large-
scale central bank balance-sheet increases.
Australia
Australia experienced a sharp but mild reces-
sion during late 2008 and early 2009, caused in
part by reduced export demand and weaker con-
sumer confidence. Stevens (2009) notes that the
Reserve Bank of Australia had started easing
policy in early September due to moderating
demand, reducing its target overnight rate from
7.25 percent to 7 percent. Easing accelerated
after the Lehman Brothers failure; the target was
reduced by 300 basis points during the last four
months of 2008 (including a 100-basis-point cut
on October 8, 2008, coordinated with 50-basis-
point or larger reductions by other G-10 central
banks). Private net capital flows were negative in
the third and fourth quarters of 2008, in part
because Australian banks found Federal Reserve
foreign currency swap lines a lower-cost source of
funds than alternatives, particularly in 2008:Q4.21
By mid-2009, global short-term credit markets
were normalizing and Australian banks were
obtaining funds in the market below the cost of
the Fed’s swap facility. The policy target rate
reached its low of 3 percent on April 8, 2009,
and on October 7, 2009, the Research Bank of
Australia (RBA) started the process of increasing
its target rate toward “a more normal setting”
with a 25-basis-point increase.
The RBA’s policy actions do not merit the
label “quantitative easing” because the policy
target rate never reached zero during mid-2009.
Yet, the RBA balance sheet expanded sharply
between August and December 2008, resulting in
a 54 percent increase in the monetary base (mea-
sured as the sum of “Reserves and Notes” plus
“Term Deposits”). Figure 10 shows the growth
and changing composition of the RBA balance
sheet. A number of domestic programs affected
the balance sheet, including (i) broadening the
pool of eligible collateral accepted by the RBA,
(ii) conducting open market operations at longer
maturities to increase the impact on longer-term
yields, and (iii) offering term deposits at the RBA.22
Deposits obtained by the RBA under the Federal
Reserve’s swap lines are included in the asset
“Gold and Foreign Exchange,” whereas the
Australian dollars held as collateral by the Federal
Reserve are included in the liability item “Deposits
of Overseas Institutions.” Interestingly, the RBA
unwound its balance-sheet expansion in the first
half of 2009 without rapid increases in its policy
target rate: By May 2009, the level of the mone-
tary base had returned approximately to its trend
with the policy target rate at 4.25 percent.
21 D’Arcy and Ossolinski (2009) report that some Australian banks,
successful bidders for U.S. dollars at RBA auctions, apparently
reloaned the dollar funds to foreign parents.
22 For additional details, see Stevens (2010) and Debelle (2008).
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20 For details, see Mutikainen (1998).Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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Composition of Reserve Bank of Australia Balance Sheet
NOTE: The monetary base of Australia is approximately equal to “Reserves and Notes” plus “Term Deposits.”
SOURCE: Reserve Bank of Australia.There is no evidence that the RBA’s actions
affected inflation. Before the crisis, the Australian
economy had experienced year-over-year growth
in consumer prices averaging just under 3 percent,
within the RBA’s target range of 2 to 3 percent.
Inflation expectations, however, reached as high
as 6 percent as Australia’s business cycle peaked
in May 2008 (see Figure 3), but the late 2008 dis-
turbances in financial markets caused inflation
expectations to decline precipitously. Unlike in
the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan,
inflation expectations in Australia never raised
the specter of deflation. A prompt unwinding of
its balance sheet appears to have protected infla-
tion stability.
Iceland
We mention Iceland primarily because of its
widely reported role in the banking crises of sev-
eral European nations. Iceland is unusual, in this
analysis, because its policy target rate and central
bank balance sheet increased simultaneously.
Iceland’s financial system was seriously
harmed by the recent financial crisis. Three of
the country’s largest commercial banks failed in
October 2008; the government assumed the role
as insurer of their deposits and replaced each
board of directors.23 These banks, however, had
customer liabilities with other countries in addi-
tion to Iceland, equal to roughly 10 times Iceland’s
annual gross national product (see Central Bank
of Iceland [CBI], 2009b, p. 13). As a result of the
bank failures, Iceland’s exchange rate fell sharply
in October 2008; Iceland obtained a $2.1 billion
loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
to stabilize its financial system.
Before receiving the IMF loan to stabilize the
country’s economy, in January 2008 the CBI had
expanded the list of eligible collateral at its regu-
lar lending facilities to include bonds issued in
dollars, euros, or British pounds but continued
to require that at least 50 percent of collateral be
denominated in kronor. By August 2008, the CBI
went a step further, expanding the list of eligible
collateral to include asset-backed securities and
reducing the krona requirement to 30 percent.
Bank runs began the first week of October:
Currency in circulation increased 53 percent
that week (see Central Bank of Iceland, 2009b,
pp. 24-25). The CBI used its reserves—even old
banknotes no longer intended for circulation—
to meet public demand. The combination of
increased loans to banks24 and currency in cir-
culation caused the CBI’s balance sheet to increase
rapidly during the fall of 2008. At its peak,
Iceland’s monetary base had increased by 70
percent with highly volatile swings from month
to month.
The CBI sought to distinguish its traditional
approach to monetary policy (targeting the dis-
count rate) from its balance-sheet actions. In
October 2008, for example, the CBI increased its
policy rate (the nominal discount rate) from 12
percent to 18 percent. At this time, year-over-year
inflation had been steadily increasing since 2007
and was close to 15 percent. In pursuing its infla-
tion target of 2.5 percent, the CBI had held its
policy rate above 10 percent since 2005.25 The
CBI changed course in March 2009 after inflation
began to subside (albeit still at high levels). The
nominal discount rate dropped to 11 percent in
November 2009. Because inflation was well above
the target at the beginning of the crisis, it is diffi-
cult to assess whether the balance-sheet expan-
sion affected either actual or expected inflation.
However, the CBI forecasts that inflation will
reach its target of 2.5 percent sometime in early
2011 (Central Bank of Iceland, 2009b), suggesting
that the monetary base increases are not antici-
pated to increase inflation pressures.
New Zealand26
New Zealand’s monetary base increased 138
percent between July and December 2006. No
adverse “shock” to the economy caused the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to increase
its monetary base. Rather, the increase was the
23 For additional details, see Central Bank of Iceland (2009a).
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24 Iceland’s treasury purchased a 75 percent share in one bank (Glitnir)
for €600 million and a week later the CBI loaned €500 million to
another bank (Kaupthing) for four days.
25 The CBI adopted an inflation target in March 2001.
26 For additional details, see Nield (2008).Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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Composition of Reserve Bank of New Zealand Balance Sheet
NOTE: The Reserve Bank of New Zealand does not publish a series on the monetary base. It does publish data on settlement institution
deposits at the RBNZ and currency in circulation, the sum of which is a measure of the monetary base.
SOURCE: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.culmination of a collaborative project between
the Reserve Bank and the settlement banks to
improve the payment system to “reduce risk and
enhance certainty in the financial system” (Nield,
2008, p. 10). The RBNZ-operated payment system
does not permit daylight overdrafts (i.e., payments
on behalf of a bank that exceed the bank’s avail-
able account balance at the RBNZ). Increased
settlement balances at the RBNZ significantly
reduced delays in the payment system. The RBNZ
also began paying interest on its settlement bal-
ances to increase the acceptance of the system
and to discourage banks from using these reserve
balances to fund new lending.
The new settlement system was implemented
between August and October 2006. The RBNZ
expected the monetary base would increase to
between NZ$7 billion and NZ$10 billion (Nield,
2008) as banks gradually unwound Treasury bill
holdings and used foreign exchange swaps to
purchase New Zealand dollars. The RBNZ deter-
mined that since the cash was purchased at rates
consistent with the policy rate, there would be
no inflationary pressures. In fact, year-over-year
growth in consumer prices fell from 3.4 percent
in 2006:Q3 to 1.8 percent in 2007:Q3. It did, how-
ever, increase to 5 percent in 2008:Q3 only to
again drop under 2 percent in 2009:Q2. Over the
same period, inflation expectations remained
well anchored around 3 percent.
The financial crisis hit New Zealand in mid-
2008. Between July 2008 and April 2009, as infla-
tion expectations plummeted, the RBNZ reduced
its target for the official cash rate to 2.5 percent
from 8.25 percent. Although the RBNZ has not
emphasized increases in its balance sheet as part
of its policy, Figure 11 shows clearly that large
balance-sheet increases did occur. More recently,
the RBNZ balance sheet has contracted somewhat
as the crisis has eased, although a weak economic
outlook has caused the RBNZ to sustain a low
policy target rate.
CONCLUSION
During the past two decades, large increases—
and decreases—in central bank balance sheets
have become a viable monetary policy tool. His  -
torically, doubling or tripling a country’s mone-
tary base was a recipe for certain higher inflation.
Often such increases occurred only as part of a
failed fiscal policy or, perhaps, as part of a policy
to defend the exchange rate. Both economic
models and central bank experience during the
past two decades suggest that such changes are
useful policy tools if the public understands the
increase is temporary and if the central bank has
some credibility with respect to desiring a low,
stable rate of inflation. We find little increased
inflation impact from such expansions.
For monetary policy, our study suggests sev-
eral findings:
(i) A large increase in a nation’s balance sheet
over a short time can be stimulative.
(ii) The reasons for the action should be com-
municated. Inflation expectations do not
move if households and firms understand
the reason(s) for policy actions so long as
the central bank can credibly commit to
unwinding the expansion when appropriate.
(iii) The type of assets purchased matters less
than the balance-sheet expansion.
(iv) When the crisis has passed, the balance
sheet should be unwound promptly.
Anderson, Gascon, Liu
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